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Introduction
The core of a transferable utility game (TU-game), as introduced by Gillies (1953) , consists of all efficient payoff vectors for the monetary value of the grand coalition from which no coalition has an incentive to deviate. Some well-known core catchers are the dominance core (cf. Gillies, 1953 Gillies, , 1959 , the Weber set (Weber, 1988) and the core cover (Tijs and Lipperts, 1982) .
The literature shows that both convex games (Shapley, 1971) , for which the core equals the Weber set, and compromise stable games (Quant et al, 2005) , which are balanced games for which the core equals the core cover, have several interesting and helpful properties. Restricting attention to compromise stability, we want to mention that the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) of any compromise stable game can be directly computed by using the Aumann Maschler rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) of an associated bankruptcy game (cf. O'Neill , 1982) , thus unifying seemingly unrelated results on the nucleolus for, e.g., bankruptcy games and clan games (Potters et al, 1989) .
The definition of the core cover of a TU-game is based on individual minimal rights and on individual marginal contributions to the grand coalition N. This paper aims for an extension of the core cover based on coalitional considerations. Individual marginal contributions can readily be extended to coalitional marginal contributions using the corresponding dual game. This paper proposes to extend individual minimal rights to coalitional ones by using for each coalition S minimal balanced families on N \ S with the size of its elements restricted to at most |S|. In this way, an associated minimal rights game is obtained. A first result shows that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of its corresponding minimal rights game.
Using the dual game and the minimal rights game, we define the k-core cover, with k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}, of a TU-game with player set N as the set of all efficient payoff vectors for which the total joint payoff to any coalition S of size at most k is bounded from above by the value of S in the corresponding dual game, and from below by the value of S in the corresponding minimal rights game. It is shown that the 1-core cover coincides with the core cover, that each k-core cover is a core catcher and, interestingly, that the core is a k-core cover with 1 k = |N| 2 . Defining a game to be k-compromise admissible if the k-core cover is nonempty, and kcompromise stable if it is balanced and the k-core cover and core coincide, this paper characterizes k-compromise admissible games and k-compromise stable games by means of conditions on specific minimal balanced families in both the dual game and the minimal rights game.
Finally, we show that assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972 ) are a specific case of 2-compromise stable games.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents basic definitions and notations regarding TU-games and balanced families. Section 3 introduces and analyzes minimal right games and the k-core cover, while Section 4 characterizes k-compromise admissible games and k-compromise stable games. Section 5 shows that assignment games are 2-compromise stable.
Preliminaries
A transferable utility game (TU-game) is an ordered pair (N, v) where N is a finite set of players and v : 2 N → R satisfies v(∅) = 0. In general, v(S) represents the value of coalition S, that is, the joint payoff that can be obtained by this coalition when its members decide to cooperate. Let G N be the set of all TU-games with player set N. Given S ⊆ N, let |S| be the number of players in S.
The main focus within a cooperative setting is on how to share the total joint payoff obtained when all players decide to cooperate. Given a TU-game v ∈ G N , the core of v, Core(v), is defined as the set of efficient allocations (for which exactly v(N) is allocated) that are stable, in the sense that no coalition has an incentive to deviate. Formally,
It is well known that the core of a game may be empty. In Tijs and Lipperts (1982) , the core cover is introduced as a core catcher. The core cover is the set of efficient allocations in which every player gets an amount no lower than his minimal right and no higher than his utopia value. Given a game v ∈ G N and a player i ∈ N, the utopia value of player i, M i (v), is defined by
and the minimal right of player i, m i (v), is defined by
The core cover of v ∈ G N , CC(v), is defined by
A compromise admissible game is compromise stable if the core cover coincides with the core.
Theorem 2.1 (Tijs and Lipperts (1982) ). Let v ∈ G N be compromise admissible. Then,
(ii) If |N| = 3, then, Core(v) = CC(v). Quant et al (2005) characterize the class of compromise stable games.
Theorem 2.2 (Quant et al (2005) ). Let v ∈ G N be compromise admissible. Then, Core(v) = CC(v) if, and only if, for every S ⊆ N,
Let ∅ = S ⊆ N. A family B of nonempty subcoalitions of S is called balanced on S if there are positive weights δ = {δ T } T∈B , δ T > 0 for all T ∈ B, such that ∑ T∈B δ T e T = e S or, equivalently,
Here, e S ∈ R N is the characteristic vector of S and is defined by e S i = 1 if i ∈ S and e S i = 0 if i / ∈ S. Given a balanced family B, we denote by ∆(B) the set of positive weights satisfying the balancedness condition. For each k = 1, . . . , |N|, we denote by F k (S) the collection of balanced families on S such that for all B ∈ F k (S) and R ∈ B, |R| ≤ k. A balanced family B ∈ F k (S) is minimal if B ⊆ B and B ∈ F k (S) implies B = B. We denote by F m k (S) the collection of minimal balanced families on S. It is well known that a minimal balanced family has a unique vector of balanced weights. Given B ∈ F m k (S), we denote by {γ B T } T∈B the corresponding vector of balanced weights. It is also known that if B ∈ F k (S) \ F m k (S) and δ ∈ ∆(B), then, there exist B 1 , . . . , B r ∈ F m k (S) with r ≥ 2 and t 1 , . . . , t r ∈ (0, 1) with ∑ r l=1 t l = 1 such that B = ∪ r l=1 B l and δ R = ∑ l∈{1,...,r}:B l R t l γ Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) established that a game v ∈ G N has a nonempty core if, and only if, it is balanced. In fact, they show that a game has a nonempty core if, and only if, all balancedness inequalities are satisfied for minimal balanced families on N.
A family of core catchers

Utopia and minimal rights games
In this subsection we introduce the notions of the utopia and minimal rights games associated to a TU-game. 
The minimal rights game, v m , is defined by
Note that, for each S ⊆ N, v D (S) reflects the marginal contribution of coalition S to the grand coalition N. Therefore, if coalition S asks for a higher share of v(N) than v D (S), it will be profitable for coalition N \ S to avoid cooperation with the players of S. Accordingly, v D (S) can be interpreted as a utopia value for coalition S. Once the values of the utopia game are known to all players, the question is how to compute the minimal rights game. Following the general idea of the minimal rights of a player, we first have to consider what is left from the value of coalition T, with S ⊆ T, once the players in T \ S are paid using the utopia game; secondly, coalition S will maximize its benefit over all potential partners T\S, with S ⊆ T. Clearly, the difficulty encountered when defining the value of a coalition S in the minimal rights game is how to determine the amount that S should concede to the players of T\S, with S ⊆ T, according to the utopia game. Using a common pessimistic approach, we consider that this quantity is the maximum expected utopia value that coalition T \ S can achieve when only coalitions of size at most |S| are considered. Note that, by only considering balanced families of cardinality at most |S|, we are generalizing the concept of minimal right of a player. In fact, given a player i and a coalition T with i ∈ T, player i concedes ∑ j∈T\{i} M j (v) to the players in T \ {i}, where {{j} : j ∈ T \ {i}} is the only minimal balanced family in F m |{i}| (T \ {i}). To conclude, note that if |T \ S| < |S|, then, F m |T\S| (T \ S) = F m |S| (T \ S) since all coalitions in any minimal balanced family in F m |S| (T \ S) are contained in T \ S. The following result states that the maximum expected utopia value for a coalition T over all balanced families of elements with cardinality at most k and over all associated positive weights is achieved in a minimal balanced family. Therefore, the definition of minimal rights game coincides with our informal description. Proposition 3.2. Let v ∈ G N , T ⊆ N, and k ∈ {1, . . . , |T|}. Then,
Example 3.3. Consider the game v ∈ G N given in Table 1 , where also the values of the utopia and minimal rights games are provided. Next, we illustrate the computation of v m ({1}), v m ({1, 2}), and v m ({1, 2, 3}). The following proposition gives some straightforward implications of the definitions of utopia and minimal rights games. In fact, statement (a) implies that utopia and minimal rights games generalize the utopia values and minimal rights of players. We recall that a game
Proof. The first three items are straightforward.
e) Let v be convex. First, we show that for all S ⊆ R ⊆ N,
or, equivalently, that
where the inequality follows from convexity of v.
Next, we show that for all S ⊆ R ⊆ N,
Clearly, with B = {{i} : i ∈ R \ S} ∈ F m |S| (R \ S) and γ B U = 1 for every U ∈ B, we have
where the last equality follows from (2).
k-core covers
This subsection introduces the k-core cover of a TU-game v ∈ G N , where k is a natural number between 0 and |N|. The k-core cover is the set of efficient allocations in which every coalition of size less than or equal to k gets an amount no lower than its value of the minimal rights game and no higher than its value of the utopia game. Formally, we have Definition 3.5. Let v ∈ G N and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , |N|}. The k-core cover of v, CC k (v), is defined by
Remark 3.1. Equivalently, the k-core cover can be recursively defined as follows.
The following result states that any k-core cover is a core catcher.
Proof. Clearly, we only have to show the last equality. First, we show "⊆". For this, let x ∈ CC |N| (v). We show that x ∈ Core(v). Note that
where the last inequality follows from Proposition 3.4 c). Therefore, x ∈ Core(v).
To show that ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v m (S), let T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T. Then, for every B ∈ F m |S| (T \ S), we have that
where the second inequality follows from Equation (4). Hence,
Using Theorem 3.6, it can be shown that the core of a game coincides with the core of its minimal rights game.
Theorem 3.7. Let v ∈ G N and v m its minimal rights game. Then, Core(v) = Core(v m ).
Moreover, it turns out that the core of a game with set of players N coincides with the |N| 2 -core cover. From this fact, one can easily derive the coincidence of the core and the 1-core cover for arbitrary 3-player games (cf. Theorem 2.1 (ii)).
Proof. Using Theorem 3.6, it is sufficient to show that Core(v) ⊇ CC
where the first inequality is a direct consequence of the definition of 
where the first inequality is a direct consequence of x ∈ CC |N| 2 (v) and 0 < |N\S| < |N| 2 . Consequently, x ∈ Core(v).
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.8, we have the following result.
Since, by Theorem 3.6, the k-core cover is contained in the l-core cover for every l < k, it is useful to define the smallest nonempty k-core cover of a game. Definition 3.10. For v ∈ G N , the least core cover, LCC(v), is defined by LCC(v) = CC k * (v) where
Note that the least core cover is a nonempty core catcher. Besides, if v is balanced, then, LCC(v) = Core(v). The following example illustrates the least core cover of a game with an empty core.
Example 3.11. Consider the 6-player game v ∈ G N where the characteristic function is given by
First, we show that this game has an empty core. For this, suppose that the core is nonempty and let x ∈ Core(v). Then, x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ≥ 5 and x 4 + x 5 + x 6 ≥ 5. Adding both inequalities and taking into account that ∑ 6 i=1 x i = v(N) = 8 since x ∈ Core(v), we obtain 8 = ∑ 6 i=1 x i ≥ 10, establishing a contradiction. According to Theorem 3.8, CC 3 (v) = Core(v) = ∅. It turns out that the game has a nonempty 2-core cover. We subsequently compute the 1-and 2-core covers.
Therefore, CC 1 (v) = ∅ and it is given by 2 CC 1 (v) = con({3e {i} + 3e {j} + 2e {k} : i, j, k ∈ N, |{i, j, k}| = 3}).
Next, we compute the 2-core cover. Note that v D ({i, j}) = v(N) − v(N \ {i, j}) = 8 − 4 = 4 for all i, j ∈ N with i = j. Moreover, for all i, j ∈ N with i = j and all S ⊆ N with i, j ∈ S and |S| ≥ 4, we
Then, for all i, j ∈ N with i = j, v m ({i, j}) ≤ v D ({i, j}) and
4 k-compromise admissibility and k-compromise stability 4.1 k-compromise admissible games
2 Given a finite set A ⊆ R N , con(A) denotes the convex hull of A.
Note that any game is 0-compromise admissible. Before characterizing k-compromise admissibility, we introduce the concepts of k-core and k-anti core.
Definition 4.2. Let v ∈ G N and k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}. The k-core of v, Core k (v), is the set of efficient allocations that are stable for coalitions of size smaller than or equal to k. Formally,
The following result follows directly from the definitions of k-core and k-anti core.
As an immediate consequence, we have 
Next, we introduce the concepts of k-balanced games and k-dual balanced games and show that k-balancedness (k-dual balancedness) is a sufficient and necessary condition for non-emptiness of the k-core (k-anti core).
Definition 4.5. Let v ∈ G N and k ∈ {1, . . . , |N|}.
• v is k-balanced if for all balanced families B ∈ F k (N) and all {δ S } S∈B ∈ ∆(B),
• v is k-dual balanced if for all balanced families B ∈ F k (N) and all {δ S } S∈B ∈ ∆(B),
Just like for balanced games, one defines k-minimal balanced and k-minimal dual balanced games based on k-minimal balanced families.
The following theorem extends the characterization of Bondareva-Shapley of nonemptiness of the core (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967) to the nonemptiness of the k-core and the k-anti core. The proof follows the same lines as the proof in Shapley (1967) and the proof of Theorem 4.8 below and is, therefore, omitted. Example 4.7. Consider the 6-player game v ∈ G N where the characteristic function is given by
if |S| = 2 and 1 ∈ S, 2 if |S| = 2, 1 ∈ S, and 2 ∈ S, 1 if |S| = 2, 1 ∈ S, and 2 ∈ S, To see this we give the values of the minimal rights game and the utopia game for coalitions of cardinality at most 2. We have that v m (S) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N with |S| ≤ 2 and
if |S| = 1, 3.5 if |S| = 2 and 1 ∈ S, 2.5 if |S| = 2, 1 ∈ S, and 2 ∈ S, 1.5 if |S| = 2 and 1, 2 ∈ S.
Note that (2.5, 1.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.75) ∈ Core 2 (v m ) and (2.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.5) ∈ ACore 2 (v D ).
To see this, suppose that the 2-core cover is nonempty and let x ∈ CC 2 (v). Then, x 1 + x 3 ≥ 3, x 1 + x 4 ≥ 3, x 2 + x 5 ≥ 2, x 2 + x 6 ≥ 2 and x 1 + x 2 ≤ 3.5. Adding the first four inequalities and subtracting the last one, and taking into account that ∑ 6 i=1 x i = v(N) = 6.25, we obtain 6.25 = ∑ 6 i=1 x i ≥ 6.5. Next, we characterize the class of k-compromise admissible games. Note that k-compromise admissibility, for k ≥ |N| 2 , is equivalent to balancedness by Theorem 3.8 which is equivalent to balancedness of the minimal rights game by Theorem 3.7. Therefore, we restrict our attention to k-compromise admissibility for k ∈ {1, . . . , 
If B = {{i} : i ∈ N}, then, γ B {i} = 1 for every i ∈ N and the condition in Theorem 4.8 becomes
for every i ∈ N and the condition in Theorem 4.8 becomes
(ii) It can be easily seen that the conditions a)
are necessary for kcompromise admissibility. They are however not sufficient for k > 1 as we see below.
Note that the game in Example 4.7 satisfies v m (S) ≤ v D (S) for all S ⊆ N such that |S| ≤ 2 and
To see this, we take B = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 5}, {2, 6}, {3, 4, 5, 6}} ∈ F m 2,|N|−2 where γ B S = 1 2 for every S ∈ B. Then, Quant et al (2005) introduce and characterize the class of compromise stable games, which are those games that are compromise admissible and for which the core and the core cover coincide. Here, we perform a similar analysis for so called k-compromise stable games.
k-compromise stable games
Note that a k-compromise stable game is k-compromise admissible and that, consequently, the k-core cover, which coincides with the core, is nonempty and the game is balanced. The game in Example 3.11 has an empty core and, therefore, it is not k-compromise stable for any k.
Example 4.10. Reconsider the game v ∈ G N in Example 3.3. It is readily checked that this game is 1-compromise stable since Core(v) = CC 1 (v) = con({(2, 2, 3, 3), (2, 2, 2, 4), (2, 1, 3, 4), (1, 2, 3, 4)}).
Note that for each balanced game, the game is |N| 2 -compromise stable. Our main theorem will provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a balanced game to be k-compromise stable with k ∈ {1, . . . , Lemma 4.11. Let v ∈ G N be a balanced game and k ∈ {1, . . . ,
Proof. We prove a) in detail. The proof of b) can be done following similar arguments and c) is an immediate consequence of a) and b) combined. First, we show the "if" part. Let
for all S ⊆ N. We show that Core k (v m ) = Core(v). By Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 3.7, we know that
Therefore, using (5),
Next, we show the "only if" part. Let Core k (v m ) = Core(v). First, note that Core k (v m ) is nonempty and can be obtained as the set of optimal solutions of the linear programming problem (P 1 ):
where the second inequality follows from the fact that {S} ∈ F m k (S) with γ
. Therefore, we can now modify problem (P 1 ) into problem (P 2 )
where for each S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ k + 1, the inequality constraint ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v m (S) is redundant. As a consequence, for every S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ k + 1, there exists a non-negative linear combination of the constraint inequalities in (P 1 ) such that the linear combination makes the inequality ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v m (S) redundant. That is, there exists {δ R } R⊆S, |R|≤k with δ R ≥ 0 for each R ⊆ S with |R| ≤ k and ∑ R δ R = 1, or equivalently, there is B ∈ F k (S) and {δ R } R∈B ∈ ∆(B) such that
, where the first inequality is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.4 c) and the last equality is based on the same type of argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Note that Lemma 4.11 c) provides a sufficient condition for k-compromise admissibility.
The following result provides a full characterization of the class of k-compromise stable games.
Theorem 4.12. Let v ∈ G N be a balanced game and k ∈ {1, . . . , 
Proof. We start showing the "only if" part. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , |N| Core(v). We show that (7) is satisfied. Let S ⊆ N be such that |S| ≤ k. Then,
where the second inequality follows by considering B = {S} and γ B S = 1. Therefore, (7) follows.
Note that Theorem 3.6 and the assumption CC
for all l > k. Therefore, the inequalities ∑ i∈R x i ≥ v m (R), with |R| > k, are redundant in the description of CC l (v) for every l ≥ |R| and, in particular, ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v m (S) is also redundant in the description of CC l (v) for every l ≥ |S|. Now, suppose that we can derive ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v m (S) as a positive linear combination of inequalities of the form
establishing a contradiction with (8). Therefore, there must exist a linear combination of in- (7) follows.
To conclude, we show the "if" part. Assume that
for every S ⊆ N. We have to show that CC k (v) = Core(v). By Theorem 3.6, it suffices to prove
and v m (R) ≤ ∑ i∈R x i ≤ v D (R) for every R ⊆ N with |R| ≤ k. We have to show that ∑ i∈S x i ≥ v(S) for every S ⊆ N.
Second, let S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ |N| − k. Then, |N \ S| ≤ k and
where the first inequality follows from the fact that ∑ i∈R x i ≤ v D (R) for every R ⊆ N with |R| ≤ k. Third, let S ⊆ N with k < |S| < |N| − k. We distinguish between two situations:
1. max
By Condition (7), we have that
where the inequality follows from the fact that ∑ i∈R x i ≥ v m (R) for every R ⊆ N with |R| ≤ k.
where the inequality follows from the fact that ∑ i∈R x i ≤ v D (R) for every R ⊆ N with |R| ≤ k.
Note that, for the case k = 1, we have that the characterization in Theorem 4.12 boils down to Theorem 2.2. Example 4.13. Consider the 6-player game v ∈ G N given by
It turns out that this game is 2-compromise stable, but not 1-compromise stable, that is, 0  5  10  15  20   Table 2 : Game, utopia game, and minimal rights game in Example 4.13.
Assignment games and 2-compromise stability
This section shows that assignment games as introduced in Shapley (1967) are 2-compromise stable. In an assignment situation there is a two sided market with finite and disjoint set of buyers, M, and of sellers, M . We denote m = |M|, m = |M |, and |N| = m + m . The worth obtained when one buyer i ∈ M and one seller j ∈ M decide to cooperate is a ij ≥ 0. These values can be represented in an m × m matrix A. Following the notation in Núñez and Rafels (2002) , a matching between coalitions S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M is a subset µ of S × T such that each player belongs to at most one pair in µ. Given two coalitions S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M , we denote the set of matchings between S and T by M(S, T); then, the maximum value that S ∪ T can obtain from cooperation is max µ∈M(S,T) ∑ (i,j)∈µ a ij .
Given an assignment situation ((M, M ), A), the associated assignment game
Given an optimal matching µ ∈ M(M, M ) for M and M , Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that the nonempty core of the assignment game v is given by 
be an optimal matching for M and M , let (x, y) ∈ CC 2 (v), and let i ∈ M and j ∈ M . Clearly,
where the second equality follows because µ is optimal for M and M and (i, j) ∈ µ. Therefore, all inequalities are equalities. Since (x, y) ∈ CC 2 (v), we have that a ij = v m ({i, j}) ≤ x i + y j ≤ v D ({i, j}) = a ij and x i + y j = a ij .
Second, let (i, j) ∈ µ. Then, v m ({i, j}) ≥ v({i, j}) = a ij . Since x i + x j ≥ v m ({i, j}), we have that
Third, let i ∈ M be not assigned by µ. Then,
where the second equality follows because µ is optimal for M and M and i is not assigned by µ. Therefore, all inequalities are equalities. Since (x, y) ∈ CC 2 (v), we have that 0 = v m ({i}) ≤ Therefore, (x, y) ∈ Core(v).
Remark 5.1. In fact, it can be seen that the core of an assignment game coincides with the 2-core of the corresponding minimal rights game and with the 2-anti core of the utopia game.
Therefore, the class of assignment games satisfies the conditions in Lemma 4.11 c).
The following example illustrates that assignment games can be 1-compromise stable.
Example 5.2. Consider M = {1, 2, 3} and M = {4} and the assignment matrix A = (1, 1, 1) t . It is easy to check that Core(v) = {(0, 0, 0, 1)} = CC 1 (v). This game is both 1-and 2-compromise stable.
Consider M = {1, 2} and M = {3, 4} and the assignment matrix A = 5 3 4 3 .
Then, Core(v) = con{(0, 0, 5, 3), (1, 0, 4, 3), (3, 3, 2, 0), (4, 3, 2, 1)} = CC 2 (v) while Core(v) = CC 1 (v)
since (1, 3, 1, 3) ∈ CC 1 (v) \ Core(v). This game is 2-compromise stable, but not 1-compromise stable. Obviously, the set of feasible solutions of (P) is nonempty (we can take x i = a ∈ R for every i ∈ N with a big enough so that ∑ i∈R x i = |R|a ≥ v m (R) for every R ⊆ N with 0 < |R| ≤ k, ∑ i∈R x i = |R|a ≥ v(R) for every R ⊆ N with |N| − k ≤ |R| < |N|, and ∑ i∈N x i = |N|a ≥ v(N)). Moreover, the set of feasible solutions of (D) is nonempty (we can take δ N = 1 and δ R = 0 for every R ⊆ N with either 0 < |R| ≤ k, or |N| − k ≤ |R| < |N|). for every B ∈ F k,|N|−k (N) and for every δ ∈ ∆(B).
To conclude the proof, we show that v is k-compromise admissible if, and only if, it satisfies the inequalities for minimal balanced families on N in F m k,|N|−k (N). Note that if a game is kcompromise admissible, then, it also satisfies the inequalities for minimal balanced families on
